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Tracking bitcoin users activity using community
detection on a network of weak signals
Cazabet Remy, Baccour Rym, Latapy Matthieu
Abstract Bitcoin is a cryptocurrency attracting a lot of interest both from the gen-
eral public and researchers. There is an ongoing debate on the question of users’
anonymity: while the Bitcoin protocol has been designed to ensure that the activ-
ity of individual users could not be tracked, some methods have been proposed to
partially bypass this limitation. In this article, we show how the Bitcoin transac-
tion network can be studied using complex networks analysis techniques, and in
particular how community detection can be efficiently used to re-identify multiple
addresses belonging to a same user.
1 Introduction
Bitcoin is a cryptocurrency, a digital currency using a technology called blockchain
to maintain a public distributed ledger. Bitcoin is decentralized, i.e. there is no cen-
tral authority. Instead, any peer can consult the distributed ledger at any time to
check the amount of b itcoin controlled by each address, which is in fact a public
key.
The bitcoin protocol therefore has to solve a difficult problem: on the one hand,
one should not be able to track individual users’ activity, while, on the other hand,
all transactions must be public. This problem is partially solved by the possibility
for users to use as many addresses as they want. As a consequence, a same user can
use a different address each time he receives a payment, and observers cannot, in
theory, associate these different addresses to the single user that control them.
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In practice, however, previous works have shown that it is possible, using some
simple heuristics, to re-identify several addresses belonging to the same user.
In this article, we show how community detection, a well-known network analy-
sis technique, can be used to improve on these simple heuristics to better re-identify
users.
In section 2, we introduce key elements of the Bitcoin transaction system, neces-
sary to understand how re-identification is made possible. In section 3, we present
existing heuristics for user re-identification, while section 4 introduces our method
based on community detection. In section 5, we propose a framework to empirically
assess the quality of re-identification heuristics, and compare the proposed method
to existing ones.
2 Bitcoin transaction definition
To explain how re-identification techniques are made possible, it is first necessary to
explain some key elements on how the Bitcoin cryptocurrency works. In this article,
we will not describe all details of the blockchain and Bitcoin protocol, but only
relevant information for the task of user re-identification. For more details on the
protocol, one can refer to [13, 5, 8].
Bitcoin users can exchange amounts through transactions, recorded in a public
ledger, the blockchain. These transactions are characterized by:
• m outputs, each associated with:
– A bitcoin amount
– A public key (address)
• n inputs, each corresponding to the output of a previous transaction (thus indi-
rectly to its bitcoin amount and public key)
• A time stamp, which is an approximate value (due to the distributed nature of the
blockchain, the timestamp is not exact, and in some cases, a transaction can take
as input the output of a transaction with a later timestamp.
The sum of the inputs of a transaction is equal to the sum of the outputs plus an
optional transaction fee.
Each address, which is in fact a public key, is associated with a private key. Both
of them have been generated by the same user, and, while the public key is publicly
shared, the pivate key is kept secret. To spend the bitcoins received at an address,
its owner must ”unlock” it by using its private key, as defined by the encryption
protocol.
At this point, it is necessary to point out some important consequences of this
mechanism:
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• The balance of a user u at time t is the sum of all transaction outputs that can be
unlocked by a private key owned by u, and that have not yet been unlocked (i.e.
spent) at time t.
• If two transactions T0 and T1 have the same address d among their outputs, with
respective associated amounts a1 and a2, these amounts are not merged or asso-
ciated in any manner, i.e. there is no entity corresponding to the address d that
controls, or contains, a2 + a1 bitcoins. Instead, these two outputs are uniquely
identified respectively as output m0 of transaction T0 and output m1 of transac-
tion T1, and each of these outputs can independently be used as input of a new
transaction. Their only common trait is that they can be unlocked using the same
private key, therefore by the same user.
• There is no partial spending: if a user who controls an output o1 corresponding
to x bitcoins use it as input of a transaction to send y bitcoins to another user,
with y < x, then the user must send back x− y bitcoins to an address that he/she
controls.
• Users need to create multiple-input transactions each time they need to pay an
amount superior to the value of each individual output they control.
3 Existing re-identification heuristics
Several works have tackled the problem of users re-identification. In this section,
we will describe heuristics based on transactions present in the public ledger. Some
other methods exist, using IP-addresses collected in real time while transactions
occur [2] or global activity patterns for very active users [12]. One can refer to [10]
for a recent survey on such methods.
Methods based on the public ledger are the most common ones. They have the
advantage of being based on data easily accessible to anyone.
3.1 Heuristic based on transaction inputs only
A first heuristic for re-identification has been introduced in [14]: because all private
keys corresponding to addresses must be used conjointly to sign a transaction, it can
be safely assumed that all addresses in the input of a transaction belong to the same
user. The introduction of the multisig protocol in 2013 does not dramatically change
this observation: it allows an output to be controlled by several users (all users must
use their private key to sign), but does not allow to use conjointly outputs that were
initially detained privately by different users. Furthermore, these conjointly detained
addresses are identified differently from normal ones, and are scarcely used (as of
2017).
This heuristic can be defined as:
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Heuristic H 1 All addresses used as input of the same transaction belong to the
same controlling entity, called a User.
A simple network algorithm can be used to discover these users efficiently:
1. Create a network with nodes representing addresses
2. For each set of n addresses used conjointly as input of a transaction, add n− 1
edges to create a path between them
3. Discover connected components of this network.
Connected components of this network correspond to sets of addresses belonging to
a same user.
Despite the simplicity of this heuristic, it gives good results in practice, because
users often have to use conjointly different addresses in order to perform trans-
actions. Some users also tend to reuse the same addresses multiple times, either
because they are not aware of the tracking possibility it allows, or because it is
more convenient for them. For instance, the organization Wikileaks has an official
address to which anyone can donate, therefore this address is used every time some-
one makes a donation to this organization. It is therefore possible to track how much
money this organization receives through donations to this public address.
There is debate on the efficacy of this heuristic. Interested readers can refer to [6]
for a discussion on why this method gives good results in most cases.
3.2 Heuristics based on inputs and outputs of transactions
H1 can only associate addresses because they simultaneously appear in the input of
a transaction. Another property of bitcoin is that, because users cannot do partial
spending, they have to send back to themselves the difference between the sum of
inputs and the amount to pay. To improve the user discovery process, one needs to
associate input addresses with one –or several– output addresses that belong to the
same user, called change address, or shadow address. Several authors have proposed
heuristics to discover which output address might be a change address.
Existing heuristics are searching for so-called one-time change address. Indeed,
it is a common practice to receive the change on a newly generated address, that is
never to be reused.
Androulaki et al. [1] proposed the following heuristic to discover one-time
change addresses:
Heuristic H 2 If there are exactly two output-addresses a1 and a2, that one of them
(a1) appears for the first time and that the other (a2) has appeared before, then a1
is considered to be the change address.
This heuristic has also been used in [15].
Meiklejohn et al. [11] propose a variation of this heuristic, not limited to trans-
actions with exactly 2 outputs:
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Heuristic H 3 An address is considered a one-time change address if it satisfies the
following properties:
• The transaction is not a coin generation
• The address is not among the input addresses (address reuse)
• It is the only output address appearing for the first time
In their article, by using known addresses of several users as a reference, the au-
thors are able to identify incorrectly grouped addresses, and propose a list of ad
hoc restrictions to consider an address as a one-time change address, that involves
checking if the address is not reused later, or reused only by some special services
such as gambling games, that send their payout to the change address of the pay-
ment they received. The authors point out that these restrictions are only based on
empirical observations, and cannot be generalized for future transactions.
A simple adaptation of the network algorithm described for H1 can be used for
H2 and H3: a network is created as for H1, and an edge is added between each
identified one-time change address and one of the corresponding input addresses.
Connected components of this graph correspond to set of addresses controlled by
the same user.
We can observe that there is a hierarchical relation between H1 and H2, H3: each
user of H2, H3 corresponds exactly to one or several users in H1.
A more in-depth description of these approaches and their applications can be
found in [10].
4 Proposed Heuristic for user re-identification
In this section, we propose to use community detection, a popular complex network
analysis tool, to discover addresses belonging to a same user. The method is built on
top of H1 method, using its result as input.
The main idea is to create an identity hint network, in which edges between nodes
represent hints that the corresponding set of addresses might belong to a same user.
Because community detection searches for dense subgraphs, sets of nodes with mul-
tiple hints of belonging to a same user will be grouped together by the algorithm.
Thus this solution exploits weak signals to re-identify users.
We propose to create the identity hint network using the following process:
Heuristic H 4 -
1. A first level of aggregation is created by applying H1. Sets of addresses belonging
to a same user are used as nodes of the hint network
2. For each transaction in the dataset, considering users found by H1 instead of
individual addresses, an edge is added (if not already present) between the (nec-
essarily unique) sender and each recipient if:
• there are less than 10 users in the ouput of the transaction (recipients)
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• all recipients are different from the sender, i.e there is no already known
change address
On this network, a community detection algorithm is applied. Communities cor-
respond to unique users.
In our experiments, we used a popular hierarchical community detection algo-
rithm, the Louvain algorithm [3], that yields several solutions at different levels of
aggregation.
For a given level, we consider that a community corresponds to a user, and that
this user controls all addresses associated with nodes in the cluster. As with H2 and
H3, users found by H4 can be associated with one or more users of H1, i.e. there is
a hierarchical relation between them.
5 Evaluation of user discovery heuristics
To the best of our knowledge, the quality of user re-identification heuristics has
never been assessed empirically. In this section, we propose a method to do so,
using tools from community detection and clustering.
Let’s assume that we have at our disposal a ground truth defined as a set of n la-
beled addresses aGT = {a1,a2, . . . ,an}, with a
L the label of address a, corresponding
to the user that controls it.
By using a heuristic on a transaction dataset, we discover sets of addresses identi-
fied as belonging to a same user. We assign a same label to all addresses of the same
set, thus obtaining a set of m labeled addresses, aH . By filtering out all addresses
of aH not present in aGT , we obtain a set of addresses with two sets of labelling,
the ground truth and a computed one. These labelling can be considered as clusters
or network communities, and their similarity can be computed using, for instance,
the NMI, chance adjusted NMI (aNMI) or Precision, Recall and F1-score, which all
give a different view on the tested clustering.
5.1 NMI and aNMI
The Normalized Mutual Information is frequently used to assess the correspondence
between clustering or community partitions. It comes from information theory, and
corresponds to the mutual information between the two compared partitions nor-
malized between 0 –no similarity– and 1 –identical partitions. Several variants of
the normalization can be used; in this article, we use the following definition:
NMI =
I(U,V )
√
H(U)H(V )
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With I(U,V ) the mutual information between partitions U and V , and H(U) the
entropy (or quantity of information) of partition U . For more details on NMI, please
refer to [16, 9].
Despite being often used in community detection evaluation, NMI suffers from
known limitations, in particular that random partitions have expected values higher
than 0, that can even be relatively high in some cases. A commonly used variant is
the adjusted for chance NMI, called aNMI, which conserves the normalization but
correct for the effect of chance. Please refer to [16] for more information on aNMI.
5.2 Precision, recall and F1 score
Precision and Recall are typically used to assess the quality of classification tasks.
They can also be used to evaluate the quality of clustering: Precision corresponds to
how often elements are correctly grouped together, while Recall evaluate how often
elements belonging to a same cluster are labeled as such in the tested partition.
More formally, for each pair of addresses, we check if they are TP,FP or FN:
• TP (True Positive): two addresses with the same label are in the same cluster
• FP (False Positive): two addresses with different labels are in a same cluster
• FN (False Negative): two addresses with the same label are in different clusters
Then Precision and Recall are defined as usual:
Precision =
T P
T P+FP
,Recall =
T P
T P+FN
The F1 score is the harmonic mean of Precision and Recall, and summarize the
quality of a clustering in a single value.
5.3 Test dataset
In order to compare heuristics empirically, we need a labeled dataset of users and
their known addresses. In the article [11], the authors have collected such a dataset
by engaging in interactions with many bitcoin entities. In total, they engaged in 344
transactions with a variety of services, classified in 6 categories: Mining, Wallets,
Exchanges, Vendors, Gambling and Miscellaneous. Please refer to the original ar-
ticle for more information on how the data was collected. After removing some
particular cases, such as addresses of uncertain owners, or addresses controlled by
the authors of the article, we were left with 776 addresses belonging to 90 different
users. The user with the most known addresses, wallet service instawallet, controls
151 of them, while we know only one address for 33 users.
This dataset, due to its manual collection, is of relatively limited size, but still
allows us to test our method and observe broad differences between heuristics. In
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future works, it will be necessary to collect larger labeled datasets for robuster re-
sults.
For the bitcoin transaction dataset, we limited ourselves to the one used by the
authors of the ground truth dataset [11]. It is composed of 16,086,073 transactions
and 12,056,684 distinct addresses.
5.4 Results
We computed NMI, aNMI, Precision, Recall and F1-score for H1, H3 and all hier-
archical levels of our proposed method H4. Results can be found in Tab. 1
Heur. Precision Recall F1 NMI aNMI
H1 0.98 0.77 0.86 0.89 0.65
H3 0.09 0.83 0.16 0.47 0.15
H4-l1 0.75 0.79 0.77 0.86 0.66
H4-l2 0.50 0.87 0.63 0.81 0.67
H4-l3 0.27 0.90 0.42 0.70 0.47
H4-l4 0.25 0.91 0.39 0.67 0.43
Table 1 Empirical comparison of User re-identification algorithms. H4-l1 to H4-l4 correspond to
the increasing hierarchical levels of the community detection based method (H4). Highest values
in bold, lowest ones in italic.
As expected, Precision score for the H1 Heuristic is very high, which means
that when two addresses are grouped together, they nearly always belong to the
same user. By manually investigating the error, we found that addresses mistakingly
grouped together belonged to two companies, one being in fact a branch of the other.
More surprisingly, the Recall score is already relatively high for this heuristic.
By adopting H3, which creates larger clusters, the Recall score rises. However,
this gain is made at the cost of an important decrease in Precision, thus resulting in
lower overall scores (F1, NMI and aNMI)
We can observe that, as expected, our method reach higher Recall than the H1
method, at the cost of a lower Precision. However, compared to H3, the loss in
precision is lower. In particular, partitions of the highest level (H4-l3,H4-l4) obtain
higher scores than H3 on all tested metrics (Pareto dominance). H4-l1 and H4-l2,
solutions of lower hierarchical levels, obtain highest aNMI score than the reference
H1 metric.
5.5 Visual representation of re-identification
To better understand the differences between different heuristics, we propose to
use a visual representation. We propose to use alluvial diagrams to compare re-
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identification algorithms results. In this visualization, each represented clustering
is represented on a vertical axis; each address is represented by a horizontal, going
from the cluster it belongs to in one clustering to the cluster it belongs to in the other
clustering. A layout algorithm minimizes line crossings; horizontal lines with two
common endpoints are grouped into a larger line, whose width corresponds to the
sum of widths of addresses it represents.
To limit the visual complexity, we restrain the representation to one type of la-
beled users, which correspond to wallet services. Results for other types of users
leads to the same kinds of observations.
Fig. 1 represents the correspondence between clusters in the ground truth and
H1. We can observe that users controlling large sets of addresses tend to be well
discovered (large horizontal lines for instawallet, easywallet, paytunia, flexcoin). We
can also observe that there is no cluster in H1 with addresses belonging to different
users in the ground truth.
Fig. 2 represents the correspondence between clusters of addresses between the
ground truth, H1 and H3. We can observe in H3 the presence of a large cluster (0)
gathering addresses from different users in the ground truth. We can observe one
occurrence (cluster 24620 in H3) of a cluster in H3 rightfully grouping together
distinct clusters from H1.
Fig. 3 represents the matching between clusters of addresses in the ground truth,
H1 and H4-l2. We can observe that some entities in the ground truth (flexcoin, in-
stawallet, parts of coinbase and easywallet), are erronously merged in H4-l2, but
less than with H3, as shown in Fig. 2. On the contrary, we observe several cases
where different clusters in H1 are correctly merged by H4-l2 into clusters very close
to those of the ground truth (for paytunia, easywallet and coinbase, in particular)
We can therefore conclude that the proposed method offer a better solution than
the H3 method, and even provide a relevant alternative to the widespread H1 solu-
tion.
5.6 Advantages of the proposed method
On top of yielding a relevant user discovery solution, the community detection ap-
proach has several advantages:
• Because it allows to extract several hierarchical levels, one can choose, depend-
ing on the application, to increase Recall at the cost of Precision, or said dif-
ferently, to discover more addresses for known users, at the risk of mistakingly
merging different users.
• Because the solution is not based on a set of rules, but on weak signals, it is more
difficult for users to develop countermeasures to escape re-identification of their
addresses
• The proposed solution is a generic framework that can be adapted in countless
ways to be improved: one could create a different hint network, using weighted
edges based on rules decided by experts, or based on machine learning. One
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Fig. 1 Alluvial diagram representing the matching between clusters of addresses in the ground
truth and H1. Each horizontal line corresponds to an address. A thick line corresponds to the
aggregation of a set of addresses with common left and right belongings. We can observe that
some entities (e.g instawallet) are already quite well identified by this heuristic, for the given test
set. Nevertheless, for most entities, their addresses are divided into several clusters in H1.
Fig. 2 Alluvial diagram representing the matching between clusters of addresses in the ground
truth, H3 and H1. We can observe the apparition of a large cluster (named 0) that merge together
many addresses corresponding in fact to different entities (Paytunia, easywallet, flexcoin, instawal-
let, etc.).
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Fig. 3 Alluvial diagram representing the matching between clusters of addresses in the ground
truth, H3 and H1. We can observe the apparition of a large cluster (named 0) that merge together
many addresses corresponding in fact to different entities (Paytunia, easywallet, flexcoin, instawal-
let, etc.).
could also use other community detection algorithms. Finally, one could also
take into account the dynamic of transactions, through temporal networks [7]
and dynamic community detection [4].
6 Conclusion
In this article, we have shown how community detection could be used to improve
re-identification of users in bitcoins.
We think that this article has two main contributions: on the one hand, it provides
a framework for empirical testing and comparison of re-identification algorithms.
The dataset used as ground truth is limited in size and representativeness, and further
work is needed to produce more ambitious ground truth datasets in order to validate
algorithms on a large scale.
On the other hand, we have shown how using complex networks analysis tools
such as community detection could improve existing techniques, based on set of
rules. In particular, contrary to set of rules techniques, they cannot be easily by-
passed by users when publicly released.
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